Games on union closed systems by Brink, J.R. van den et al.
TI 2011-036/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
 
Games on Union Closed Systems 
  
René van den Brink1 
Ilya Katsev2 
Gerard van der Laan1 
 
1 VU University Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg. 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, 
with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in 
core areas of finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
Games on Union Closed Systems1
René van den Brink2 Ilya Katsev3 Gerard van der Laan4
February 11, 2011
1This research was partly carried out while the second author was visiting the Tinbergen
Institute, VU University Amsterdam, on NWO-grant 047.017.017 within the framework of Dutch-
Russian cooperation.
2J.R. van den Brink, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, VU University,
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: jrbrink@feweb.vu.nl
3I.V. Katsev, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of
Sciences, Tchaikovsky st. 1, 191187 St. Petersburg. E-mail:katsev@yandex.ru
4G. van der Laan, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De
Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: glaan@feweb.vu.nl
Abstract
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be
described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution
for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game.
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So,
instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of
feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N . In this paper we consider such sets
of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also
their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and
the Shapley value) are given for games on union closed systems.
Keywords: TU-game, restricted cooperation, union closed system, core, prekernel, nucle-
olus.
AMS subject classification: 91A12, 5C20
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a finite set of players
and for any subset (coalition) of players a worth representing the total payoff that the
coalition can obtain by cooperating. A (single-valued) solution is a function that assigns
to every game a payoff vector which components are the individual payoffs of the players.
In its classical interpretation, a TU-game describes a situation in which the players
in every coalition S of N can cooperate to form a feasible coalition and earn its worth. In
the literature various restrictions on coalition formation are developed.1 For example, in the
(communication) graph games of Myerson (1977) a coalition is feasible if it is connected
in a given (communication) graph. Games in which the collection of feasible coalitions
forms an antimatroid2 are considered in Algaba, Bilbao, van den Brink and Jiménez-
Losada (2003, 2004). A well-known example of an antimatroid is the collection of feasible
coalitions induced by a acyclic permission structure, i.e. players need permission from
(some of) their superiors in a hierarchical structure when they want cooperate with others.
Games with a permission structure are considered in e.g. Gilles, Owen and van den Brink
(1992), van den Brink and Gilles (1996), Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997).
A model that generalizes both the communication graph games as well as the games on
antimatroids are the games on augmenting systems, see Bilbao (2003), Bilbao and Ordóñez
(2009) and Algaba, Bilbao and Slikker (2010).
In this paper we consider games with restricted cooperation given by a collection of
feasible coalitions that is closed under union, meaning that for any pair of feasible coalitions
also their union is feasible. Since such collections are more general than antimatroids, the
class of games on union closed systems contains the class of games on antimatroids. In
van den Brink, Katsev and van der Laan (2010) two single-valued solutions for games on
union closed systems that generalize the Shapley value are defined and characterized. The
first solution is based on games with a permission structure, the other directly applies the
Shapley value to some restricted game. Both solutions generalize the Shapley value in the
sense that they are equal to the Shapley value when the union closed system is the power
set of player set N .
The restricted game considered in van den Brink et al. (2010) is defined by assigning
to each coalition the worth of its maximal feasible subset in the union closed system. In
this paper we apply several well-known solution concepts as the core, nucleolus, prekernel
and Shapley value to this restricted game. We show some interesting properties of these
1For a survey on we refer to Bilbao (2000).
2A collection of feasible coalitions A ⊆ 2N is an antimatroid if it (i) contains the ∅, (ii) is union closed
(when S,T ∈ A, then also S ∪ T ∈ A), and (iii) satisfies accessibility (for every S ∈ A there is i ∈ S such
that S \ {i} ∈ A), see Dilworth (1940) and Edelman and Jamison (1985).
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solutions on the class of games on union closed systems, in particular for monotone games.
We also give a sufficient condition to guarantee that the nucleolus is the unique point in
the intersection of the prekernel and the core.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section on cooperative
TU-games. In Section 3 we introduce games on union closed systems. Section 4 discusses
properties of some solutions for monotone games on union closed systems. Finally, Section
5 gives special attention to the prekernel.
2 TU-games and solutions
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperating can be
described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a pair
(N, v), where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of n players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function
on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e.,
the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
For ease of notation we write v(i) = v({i}) for i ∈ N . A player i ∈ N is called a veto
player if v(S) = 0 if i ∈ S and a game v is veto-rich if it contains at least one veto
player. Since we take the player set N to be fixed, we denote the game (N, v) just by its
characteristic function v. For each nonempty T ⊆ N , the unanimity game uT is given by
uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. It is well-known that the unanimity games
form a basis for GN . For every v ∈ GN it holds that v =
∑
T⊆N, T =∅ ∆T (v)uT , where
∆T (v) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S) are the Harsanyi dividends, see Harsanyi (1959).
We denote the collection of all characteristic functions on N by GN and n = |N |
denotes the cardinality ofN . A game v ∈ GN is monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
We denote by GNm the class of all monotone TU-games on N .
A payoff vector is a vector x ∈ IRn assigning a payoff xi to every i ∈ N . In the
sequel, for S ⊆ N we denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. The set of efficient payoff vectors of a game
v ∈ GN is given by
X(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N)}
and the imputation set is the set of efficient and individually rational payoff vectors given
by
I(v) = {x ∈ X(v) | xi ≥ v(i) for every i ∈ N}.
A (set-valued) solution is a mapping F : GN → IRn that assigns a (possibly empty) set
F (v) ⊂ IRn of payoff vectors to every v ∈ GN . A solution F is said to be single-valued if it
assigns to every v ∈ GN a single payoff vector F (v) ∈ IRn. Notice that F = X and F = I
2
are set-valued solutions assigning to every v the set of efficient payoff vectors, respectively
the imputation set. The most well-known set-valued solution is the core C, assigning to
every v ∈ GN the set
C(v) = {x ∈ X(v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ⊂ N}.
Since I(v) ⊆ C(v), the core is the set of stable imputations in the sense that no coalition
S can improve by separating from the grand coalition N .
A collection B of subsets B of N is said to be a balanced collection when the system
of equations∑
B∈B
λBe
B = eN
has a positive solution, where for any B ⊆ N the vector eB ∈ IRn is defined by eBj = 1
when j ∈ B and eBj = 0 otherwise. A game v ∈ G
N is balanced if
m∑
j=1
λBj v(Sj) ≤ v(N)
for every balanced collection B = {S1, . . . , Sm} ∈ B. A well-known result states that the
core of a game is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced, see Bondareva (1962)
or Shapley (1967). Notice that every veto-rich monotone game has a non-empty core
(any payoff vector that assigns worth v(N) to the veto players is in the core) and thus is
balanced.
Two other well-known solutions are the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel. To
define the (pre)nucleolus of a game v ∈ GN , let x ∈ IRn be a payoff vector. Then the excess
e(S, x) of coalition S ⊆ N is defined by
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
Further, let E(x) be the (2n− 2)-component vector that is composed of the excesses of all
coalitions S ⊂ N, S = ∅, in a non-increasing order, so E1(x) ≥ E2(x) ≥ . . . ≥ E2n−2(x).
Then the prenucleolus PN(v) of a game v ∈ GN is the unique efficient payoff vector which
lexicographically minimizes the vector-valued function E(·) over the set of efficient payoff
vectors. Formally,
PN(v) = x such that x ∈ X(v) and E(x) L E(y) for all y ∈ X(v),
where L denotes the lexicographic order of vectors. The nucleolus Nuc(v) of a game
v ∈ GN is the unique imputation which lexicographically minimizes the vector-valued
function E(·) over the imputation set, so
Nuc(v) = x such that x ∈ I(v) and E(x) L E(y) for all y ∈ I(v).
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Both the prenucleolus and the nucleolus are single-valued solutions.
To define the prekernel and the kernel of a game v ∈ GN we first introduce the
notion of complaint . For a payoff vector x ∈ IRn, the complaint of player i ∈ N against
another player j ∈ N is given by
sij(x) = max
{S⊆N |i∈S, j ∈S}
(v(S)− x(S)).
The prekernel PK assigns to every v ∈ GN the set of efficient payoff vectors
PK(v) = {x ∈ X(v)|sij(x) = sji(x) for all i, j ∈ N}
and the kernel K assigns to every v ∈ GN the set of imputations
K(v) = {x ∈ I(v)| [sij(x) = sji(x)] or [sij(x) > sji(x) and xj = v(j)] for all i, j ∈ N}.
Finally we define the least core LC(v) of a game v ∈ GN . For an efficient payoff
vector x ∈ X(v), the excess ev(x) of x is defined by
ev(x) = max
{S∈2N |S =∅,N}
e(S, x) = max
{S∈2N |S =∅,N}
(v(S)− x(S)) ,
i.e. for any coalition S = ∅, N , its payoff x(S) is at least equal to its own worth v(S) minus
the excess ev(x) with equality for at least one of these coalitions. Further the gain e(v) of
v is defined as the largest negative excess, thus
e(v) = max
x∈X(N,v)
− ev(x).
Notice that ev(x) ≤ 0 when x ∈ C(v) and e(v) ≥ 0 if and only if C(v) = ∅. Then the least
core, introduced by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979), see e.g. also Einy, Holzman and
Monderer (1999), is defined as the solution LC that assigns to game v the set of efficient
payoff vectors
LC(v) = {x ∈ X(v)|x(S) ≥ v(S) + e(v) for every S = ∅, N}.
Observe that LC(v) ⊆ C(v) if C(v) = ∅, with LC(v) = C(v) when e(v) = 0. We also have
that Nuc(v) ∈ LC(v) and that LC(v) ⊆ I(v) when v ∈ GNm .
3 Games on union closed systems
We now consider tuples (v,Ω), where v is a TU-game on player set N and Ω ⊆ 2N is a
collection of subsets of N . We call such a tuple a game with restricted cooperation. In such
a game the collection of subsets Ω restricts the cooperation possibilities of the players in
N . We say that a coalition S ∈ 2N is feasible if and only if S ∈ Ω. In this paper we only
consider sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union.
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Definition 3.1 A collection Ω ⊆ 2N is a union closed system of coalitions if
1. ∅, N ∈ Ω,
2. If S, T ∈ Ω, then S ∪ T ∈ Ω.
In the sequel we denote the collection of all union closed systems in 2N by CN .
Example 3.2
1. Both Ω = {∅, N} and Ω = 2N are union closed systems, the first one is the smallest
union closed system and the second one is the largest union closed system of subsets of N ,
i.e. {∅,N} ⊆ Ω ⊆ 2N for every union closed system Ω of subsets of N .
2. For some k ∈ {1, . . . |N |}, the collection of coalitions Ω = {S ⊆ N | |S| ≥ k} ∪ {∅}
is closed under union. More generally, let the collection P = {P 1, . . . , Pm} of nonempty
subsets of N be a partition of N , and for every P k, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let qk ∈ {1, . . . , |P
k|}
be a quotum meaning that a nonempty coaliton S ⊆ N can form S contains at least qk
players from P k for every k = 1, . . . ,m. The collection of feasible coalitions
Ω = {S ⊆ N | |S ∩ Pk| ≥ qk for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} ∪ {∅}
is closed under union.
3. Let D be an acyclic directed graph on player set N (representing for instance some
hierarchical structure), and let Ω be the collection of subsets of N such that S ∈ Ω when-
ever for every i ∈ S also all predecessors of i in the digraph D belong to S. Then Ω is union
closed. Also the collection Ω of subsets of N such that S ∈ Ω whenever for every i ∈ N
having a predecesssor in D at least one of the predecessors is in S is union closed. For
given D these collections are called the collection of conjunctive, respectively disjunctive,
feasible coalitions and are an antimatroid, see Algaba et al. (2003). Every antimatroid is
a union closed system by definition3. 
For notational convenience we require in Definition 3.1 that the grand coalition N
is feasible. The results in this paper can be modified to hold without this requirement if
in the axioms we distinguish between players that belong to at least one feasible coalition
and those that do not belong to any feasible coalition. Note that union closedness implies
that the grand coalition is feasible if every player belongs to at least one feasible coalition.
So, instead of assuming that N ∈ Ω we could do with the weaker normality assumption
3In fact, an augmenting system is an antimatroid if and only if it is closed under union, see Bilbao
(2003) and Algaba, Bilbao and Slikker (2010). Note that examples 1 and 2 above are union closed systems
that are not antimatroids.
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stating that every player belongs to at least one feasible coalition. We give some definitions
and properties for union closed systems.
Definition 3.3 For two players i, j ∈ N , i = j, player i is a superior of player j in
Ω ∈ CN , if i ∈ S for every S ∈ Ω such that j ∈ S. In that case player j is a subordinate
of i.
Corollary 3.4 If i is a superior of j in Ω and k is a superior of i in Ω then k is a superior
of j in Ω.
Further, for i ∈ N and Ω ∈ CN define
SΩi = {j ∈ N | j = i or i is a superior of j},
i.e. SΩi ⊆ N denotes the set containing player i and all subordinates of i in Ω. Then the
next proposition says that when Ω is a union closed system, for every i ∈ N the complement
of i and all its subordinates is in Ω.
Proposition 3.5 When Ω ∈ CN , then N \ SΩi ∈ Ω for every i ∈ N .
Proof. Let U be the union of all feasible sets not containing i. Since Ω ∈ CN , it follows
that U ∈ Ω. Further, by definition of U we have that i ∈ U . Consider a player j ∈ U with
j = i. It holds that any feasible set without i does not contain j. So i is a superior of j
and thus j ∈ SΩi . Hence N \ U ⊆ S
Ω
i . On the other hand, consider some player j ∈ S
Ω
i .
If j = i then j ∈ U by definition of U . If j = i, then any feasible set containing j also
contains i. Hence j ∈ U , which shows that SΩi ⊆ N \ U . Hence N \ S
Ω
i = U ∈ Ω. 
A set S ⊆ N of players can attain its value v(S) if S ∈ Ω. When S ∈ Ω then
coalition S can not be formed and so the set S of players can not realize its worth v(S).
For a tuple (v,Ω), let σΩ : 2
N → Ω be given by σΩ(S) = ∪{E∈Ω|E⊆S} E, i.e. σΩ(S) is the
largest feasible subset of S in the system Ω. By union closedness this largest feasible subset
is unique. We then define the restricted game rv,Ω ∈ GN of (v,Ω) by
rv,Ω(S) = v(σΩ(S)),
i.e. the restricted game is a standard TU-game that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N the
worth of its largest feasible subset. Notice that when Ω = {∅, N}, then σΩ(N) = N and
σΩ(S) = ∅ for all S = N and thus rv,Ω(N) = v(N) and rv,Ω(S) = v(∅) = 0 for every S = N .
Thus the restricted game rv,Ω is a multiple of the unanimity game of N , being a game in
which every player is a veto-player. When Ω = 2N then σΩ(S) = S and rv,Ω(S) = v(S) for
every S ⊆ N . In this case the restricted game rv,Ω coincides with v.
Next we generalize some inheritance properties of the restricted game which gener-
alizes known results for games with a permission tructure and games on antimatroids.
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Proposition 3.6 Let Ω ∈ CN and let v ∈ GN be a monotone game. Then
1. the restricted game rv,Ω is monotone;
2. if v is superadditive then rv,Ω is superadditive;
3. if v is balanced then rv,Ω is balanced;
4. if v is convex and Ω is closed under intersection (i.e. S, T ∈ Ω implies that S ∩ T ∈
Ω), then rv,Ω is convex.
Proof. Let Ω ∈ CN and let v ∈ GN be a monotone game.
1. By definition of σΩ it is obvious that S ⊆ T implies that σΩ(S) ⊆ σΩ(T ), and thus
by monotonicity of v, S ⊆ T implies that rv,Ω(S) = v(σΩ(S)) ≤ v(σΩ(T )) = rv,Ω(T ),
showing monotonicity of rv,Ω.
2. By union closedness, σΩ(S)∪σΩ(T ) ∈ Ω for all S, T ∈ Ω. Since σΩ(S)∪σΩ(T ) ⊆ S∪T ,
we then have σΩ(S)∪σΩ(T ) ⊆ σΩ(S ∪T ). If S ∩T = ∅ then σΩ(S)∩σΩ(T ) = ∅, and
thus rv,Ω(S)+ rv,Ω(T ) = v(σΩ(S))+ v(σΩ(T )) ≤ v(σΩ(S)∪ σΩ(T )) ≤ v(σΩ(S ∪ T )) =
rv,Ω(S ∪ T ), where the first inequality follows from superadditivity of v. This shows
superadditivity of rv,Ω.
3. This follows from Proposition 4.1 and the obvious fact that C(v) ⊆ C∗(v,Ω).
4. In 2 we already showed that by union closedness σΩ(S)∪σΩ(T ) ⊆ σΩ(S∪T ). Similar,
by intersection closedness σΩ(S)∩σΩ(T ) ∈ Ω for all S, T ∈ Ω. Since σΩ(S)∩σΩ(T ) ⊆
S∩T , we have σΩ(S)∩σΩ(T ) ⊆ σΩ(S∩T ). But then rv,Ω(S)+ rv,Ω(T ) = v(σΩ(S))+
v(σΩ(T )) ≤ v(σΩ(S) ∪ σΩ(T )) + v(σΩ(S) ∩ σΩ(T )) ≤ v(σΩ(S ∪ T )) + v(σΩ(S ∩ T )) =
rv,Ω(S ∪T )+ rv,Ω(S ∩T ), where the first inequality follows from convexity of v. This
shows convexity of rv,Ω.

A solution for games on union closed systems is a mapping F that assigns a set of
payoff vectors F (v,Ω) ⊂ IRn to every v ∈ GN and Ω ∈ CN . In this paper we only consider
solutions for games on union closed systems that assign to each tuple (v,Ω) ∈ GN × CN
the set of payoff vectors F (rv,Ω) of a solution F : GN → IR
n, i.e. a solution for games on
a union closed system assigns the set of payoff vectors that is assigned by a solution F on
GN to the restricted game rv,Ω. For ease of notation we denote F (v,Ω) = F (rv,Ω).
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4 Properties of solutions for the class of monotone
games on union closed systems
In this section we apply the solutions for TU games given in Section 2 and consider their
properties for games on union closed systems, in particular we consider the relation between
the payoffs of some player j and its superior i for monotone games on union closed systems.
Notice that when v is monotone, it holds that for every Ω ∈ CN also the restricted game rv,Ω
is monotone (by Proposition 3.6). Further it should be noticed that rv,Ω({j}) = v(∅) = 0
when j has a superior, because {j} is not feasible when j has a superior.
First we consider the core and the least core of the restricted game. When we take
as solution F the core of a game, then we obtain
C(v,Ω) = C(rv,Ω) = {x ∈ X(rv,Ω) | x(S) ≥ v(σΩ(S)), S ⊂ N}.
For a tuple (v,Ω), let C∗(v,Ω) be given by
C∗(v,Ω) = {x ∈ X(v)|x(S) ≥ v(S) for any S ∈ Ω and xj ≥ 0 for any j ∈ N}.
i.e. C∗(v,Ω) is the set of nonnegative efficient payoff vectors satisfying the core inequalities
corresponding to the feasible coalitions in Ω. It turns out that this set is equal to the core
on the class of monotone games on union closed systems.
Proposition 4.1 For every v ∈ GNm and Ω ∈ C
N we have C(v,Ω) = C∗(v,Ω).
Proof. Since N ∈ Ω we have that σΩ(N) = N and thus v(σΩ(N)) = v(N) and X(rv,Ω) =
X(v). Let x ∈ C(v,Ω). When the singleton player set {j} ∈ Ω, then σΩ({j}) = {j}
and thus v(σΩ({j})) = v({j}) ≥ 0, since v ∈ G
N
m . Otherwise σΩ({j}) = ∅ and thus
v(σΩ({j})) = v(∅) = 0. Hence for every x ∈ C(v,Ω) we have that xj ≥ v(σΩ({j})) ≥ 0
for every j ∈ N . Further, since σΩ(S) = S if S ∈ Ω, the inequalities x(S) ≥ v(σΩ(S)) for
every S ⊂ N , imply that x(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ Ω. Thus, x ∈ C∗(v,Ω).
Next, let x ∈ C∗(v,Ω). Obviously, x(S) ≥ v(σΩ(S)) for every S ∈ Ω. Since
σΩ(S) ⊆ S and xj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N , we have for any S ⊂ N and v ∈ GNm that x(S) ≥
x(σΩ(S)) ≥ v(σΩ(S)) for every S ⊂ N . Thus, x ∈ C(v,Ω).

Next recall that the least core of a monotone game is contained in the imputation
set of the game. Since the restricted game of a monotone game is also monotone, it follows
for v ∈ GNm that x ∈ I(rv,Ω) for every x ∈ LC(rv,Ω). Since, for every j ∈ N , either {j} is
feasible in Ω and thus xj ≥ v({j}) ≥ 0, or j is not feasible and xj ≥ rv,Ω({j}) = v(∅) = 0,
we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.2 Let v ∈ GNm be monotone, and Ω ∈ C
N . Then xj ≥ 0 for every x ∈
LC(rv,Ω) and j ∈ N .
For a monotone game v it is straightforward that for two union closed systems Ω1
and Ω2 such that Ω1 ⊆ Ω2, we have rv,Ω1(S) ≤ rv,Ω2(S) for every S ∈ 2
N . Therefore the
next proposition follows immediately without proof.
Proposition 4.3 Let v be monotone and Ω1, Ω2 be two union closed systems such that
Ω1 ⊆ Ω2. Then C(v,Ω2) ⊆ C(v,Ω1).
Since rv,Ω = v, and thus C(v,Ω) = C(v) when Ω = 2
N , Proposition 4.3 yields that
C(v,Ω) = ∅ for any Ω ∈ CN and v ∈ GNm with non-empty core.
In the following, let i and j be two fixed players such that i is a superior of j in
Ω (and thus rv,Ω(j) = 0). For a vector x with xj > 0 and some number 0 ≤ a ≤ xj, we
denote for fixed i and j the vector xa by4


xai = xi + a,
xaj = xj − a,
xak = xk when k = i, j.
(4.1)
Clearly, since xaj = xj−a ≥ 0 = rv,Ω({j}) we have that x
a ∈ I(N, rv,Ω) when x ∈ I(N, rv,Ω).
Moreover, for S ⊂ N


xa(S) = x(S) + a > x(S) i ∈ S, j ∈ S,
xa(S) = x(S)− a < x(S) j ∈ S, i ∈ S,
xa(S) = x(S) otherwise.
So, for every S ∈ Ω it is true that xa(S) ≥ x(S) because i is a superior of j and thus there
does not exist S ∈ Ω with j ∈ S and i ∈ S. We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 Let (v,Ω) be a monotone game on a union closed system and, for a
vector x and two players i and j such that i is a superior of j, let xa be as defined in
equation (4.1). Then
(i) if x ∈ C(v,Ω), then xa ∈ C(v,Ω) for all a ∈ (0, xj].
(ii) if x ∈ LC(v,Ω) and xi < xj, then xa ∈ LC(v,Ω) for all a ∈ (0,
1
2
(xj − xi)].
Proof. To prove (i), recall from Proposition 4.1 that
C(v,Ω) = {x ∈ X(v) x(S) ≥ v(S) for any S ∈ Ω and xj ≥ 0 for any j ∈ N}.
4There is some abuse of notation, actually xa also depends on i and j.
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Clearly, for every S ∈ Ω we have that xa(S) ≥ x(S) ≥ v(S). Further, we have for every
k = j that xak ≥ xk ≥ 0 and that x
a
j = xj − a ≥ 0. Since i is a superior of j and thus
{j} ∈ Ω, it follows that xa ∈ C(v,Ω).
To prove (ii), notice that xai ≤ x
a
j for all a ∈ (0,
1
2
(xj − xi)]. Suppose that xa is not
in LC(v,Ω). Then there exists a coalition S ⊂ N such that
xa(S)− rv,Ω(S) < e(rv,Ω). (4.2)
Since x ∈ LC(v,Ω) we have that
x(S)− rv,Ω(S) ≥ e(rv,Ω).
Hence x(S) > xa(S), implying that S contains j but not i. Let T = S\{j} and S ′ = T∪{i}.
Then
xa(S)− rv,Ω(S) = x
a(S)− v(σΩ(T ))
because i ∈ S and thus j ∈ σΩ(S). Hence
xa(S)− rv,Ω(S) = x
a(S)− v(σΩ(T )) ≥ x
a(T ) + xaj − v(σΩ(T ∪ {i})) ≥
xa(T ) + xai − v(σΩ(T ∪ {i})) = x
a(S ′)− rv,Ω(S
′),
where the second inequality follows because xai ≤ x
a
j . So, with equation (4.2) it follows
that
xa(S ′)− rv,Ω(S
′) ≤ xa(S)− rv,Ω(S) < e(rv,Ω),
which contradicts that x(S ′) − rv,Ω(S
′) ≥ e(rv,Ω). The latter inequality must hold for
x ∈ LC(v,Ω), since xa(S ′) > x(S ′) because i ∈ S ′ and j ∈ S ′. 
From Part (i) of Proposition 4.4 we obtain the following corollary, saying that when the
core of the resticted game is not empty, there exist core stable payoff vectors that give zero
payoff to every player j that has a superior in Ω.
Corollary 4.5 If C(rv,Ω) = ∅, then there exists x ∈ C(rv,Ω) such that xj = 0 for every j
that has a superior.
The final proposition in this section states that for monotone games on a union closed
system, a player gets at most the same payoff as its superior when applying the nucleolus
to the restricted game. It should be noticed that when v is monotone, Nucj(v,Ω) ≥ 0 for
all j, because Nuc(v,Ω) is in the least core of rv,Ω and thus also in I(N, rv,Ω).
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Proposition 4.6 Let (v,Ω) be a monotone game on a union closed system. Then for every
two players i and j such that i is a superior of j it holds that Nuci(v,Ω) ≥ Nucj(v,Ω).
Proof. Let w ∈ GN be a game such that for every S ⊆ N \{i, j} it holds that w(S∪{i}) ≥
w(S∪{j}). Then we know from Peleg and Südholter (2003, Theorem 5.3.5) that xi ≥ xj for
every x in the prekernel of w. Since the nucleolus of a game is in the prekernel of a game, it
is sufficient to show that for every S ⊆ N \{i, j} it holds that rv,Ω(S∪{i}) ≥ rv,Ω(S∪{j})
when i a superior of j. Indeed, in that case we have that
rv,Ω(S ∪ {i}) = v(σΩ(S ∪ {i})) ≥ v(σΩ(S)) = v(σΩ(S ∪ {j})) = rv,Ω(S ∪ {j}),
where the second equality follows from the fact that i ∈ S and there does not exist a
feasible set containing j but not i. 
In van den Brink et al. (2010) it is shown that also the Shapley value of the restricted
game satisfies this property.5
5 The prekernel of monotone games on union closed
systems
In this section we focus on the prekernel for games on union closed systems. Arin and
Feltkamp (1997) proved that the kernel of a game v ∈ GN consists of only one point (and
coincides with the nucleolus), when the game is veto-rich and I(v) is non-empty. When in
the tuple (v,Ω) there exists a player i ∈ N such that i ∈ S for every S ∈ Ω, then i is a
veto-player in the restricted game rv,Ω. When v ∈ GNm we have that I(rv,Ω) = ∅ and thus
it follows from Arin and Feltkamp (1997) that the kernel of rv,Ω has the nucleolus of rv,Ω
as its unique element. It is also well-known that for every game (N, v) with |N | ≤ 3, the
intersection of the prekernel and the core consists of at most one point. In this section we
generalize these results and give a sufficient condition to guarantee that the prekernel and
the core of a monotone game on a union closed system have at most one point in common.
Of course, when such a point exists, then it is the nucleolus of the restricted game. We
first introduce some new notions.
Definition 5.1 For two players i, j ∈ N , i = j, player i is a strong superior of player j
in Ω ∈ CN if i is a superior of j and j is not a superior of i.
Definition 5.2 A player i ∈ N is a free player in Ω ∈ CN if i has no superiors; player
i ∈ N is a weakly free player in Ω ∈ CN if i has no strong superiors.
5In this paper the Shapley value for games on union closed systems is introduced and characterized as
the so-called union rule.
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Notice that a free player is also a weakly free player and that a weakly free player i
is a superior of j when j is a superior of i. For Ω ∈ CN , we denote the set of weakly free
players by
WΩ = {i ∈ N | i is a weakly free player in Ω}.
The next proposition gives three properties of the set WΩ.
Proposition 5.3
1. For every player j ∈WΩ, there is a player i ∈WΩ, such that i is a strong superior of j.
2. When j is a superior of a player i ∈WΩ, then i is a superior of j.
3. When j is a superior of a player i ∈WΩ, then j ∈WΩ.
Proof.
1. Consider some player i0 ∈ N . If i0 is not in WΩ, then i0 has a strong superior, say
i1. Then, either i1 ∈ WΩ and thus i0 has a strong superior in WΩ, or not. In the latter
case i1 has a strong superior, say i2. When i2 is not in WΩ, it also has a strong superior.
Continuing this we get a sequence of players i0, i1, i2, . . . , im such that for h = 1, . . . ,m−1,
player ih+1 is a strong superior of ih and thus ih ∈ WΩ and either im ∈ WΩ or m ≥ 2 and
im = ik for some k = 0, . . . ,m− 2. In the latter case, by Corollary 3.4 every pair ij , iℓ with
j, ℓ ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . ,m − 1} are superiors of each other, contradicting that ih+1 is strong
superior of ih, h = k, . . . ,m− 1. Hence every next player in the sequence is different from
all preceding players. Since the number of players is finite, this case can not happen and
thus within a finite number of steps some player im ∈ WΩ is generated. By Corollary 3.4
im is a superior of i0. When i0 is a superior of im, then again by Corollary 3.4 we have
that i0 is a superior of i1, contradicting that i1 is a strong superior of i0. Hence im ∈ WΩ
and is a strong superior of i0.
2. By definition, i is a superior of j, since otherwise j is a strong superior of i, which
contradicts that i ∈WΩ.
3. Suppose j ∈ WΩ. Then by the first property, j has a strong superior k in WΩ. By
Corollary 3.4 player k is also a superior of i, and thus by property 2 we have that player
i is also a superior of k. However this implies that also j is a superior of k, contradicting
that k is a strong superior of j. 
The first property of Proposition 5.3 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4 For every Ω ∈ CN , WΩ = ∅.
Next, for i ∈ WΩ, define TΩ(i) = {j ∈ N | j = i or j is a superior of i} and let TΩ be the
collection of sets defined by
TΩ = {TΩ(i) | i ∈WΩ}.
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Notice that for every j ∈ TΩ(i) \ {i}, also i is a superior of j, because i ∈ WΩ, and thus
TΩ(i) ⊆ SΩi = {j ∈ N |j = i or i is a superior of j}. The next proposition describes the set
WΩ.
Proposition 5.5 The collection TΩ is a partition of the set WΩ.
Proof. First, by Property 3 of Proposition 5.3 we have that j ∈ WΩ when j ∈ TΩ(i) for
some i ∈WΩ and thus TΩ(i) ⊆WΩ. Next, let R ⊆WΩ×WΩ be the binary relation on WΩ
defined by (j, i) ∈ R if and only if j ∈ TΩ(i). It is sufficient to show that this relation is an
equivalence relation on WΩ, i.e. the relation is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. First,
by definition (i, i) ∈ R for all i ∈WΩ, so R is reflexive. Second, for j = i, when (j, i) ∈ R,
then j is a superior of i. By Property 2 of Proposition 5.3 then also i is a superior of j and
thus (i, j) ∈ R, showing that R is symmetric. Third, when (k, j) ∈ R and (j, i) ∈ R, then
k is a superior of j and j of i and thus, by Corollary 3.4, also k is a superior of i. Hence,
(k, i) ∈ R and thus R is transitive. Since R is an equivalence relation, it follows that the
sets TΩ(i), i ∈WΩ, are equivalence classes of WΩ and thus the collection TΩ partitions WΩ.

Proposition 5.5 implies that j ∈ TΩ(i) if and only if i ∈ TΩ(j). When, for two
different agents i, j ∈ WΩ, i is not a superior of j, then TΩ(i) and TΩ(j) are two different
equivalence classes.
Proposition 5.6 Let Ω be a union closed system. When j ∈ WΩ is a superior of i ∈ N
then every k ∈ TΩ(j) is a superior of i.
Proof. For i ∈ WΩ the proposition follows from Proposition 5.5, because TΩ(i) = TΩ(j)
when j is a superior of i. Let i ∈WΩ and j ∈WΩ be a superior of i. Then every k = j in
TΩ(j) is a superior of j and thus a superior of i by Corollary 3.4. 
Proposition 5.7 Let (v,Ω) be a game on a union closed system. When TΩ consists of
only one set, then every player in WΩ is a veto-player in the restricted game rv,Ω.
Proof. First, when TΩ consists of only one set, say T , then, by Proposition 5.5, T = WΩ.
So, TΩ(i) = WΩ for every i ∈ WΩ and thus by definition of TΩ(i) and Proposition 5.6
every player k ∈ WΩ is a superior to every other i in WΩ. Moreover, by Property 1 of
Proposition 5.3 every player not in WΩ has a player i in WΩ as its superior, and thus, again
by Proposition 5.6, every player in WΩ is a superior of every player not in WΩ. So, every
player in WΩ is a superior of every other player in N , so that every S ∈ Ω contains all
players in WΩ. 
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Notice that TΩ(i) = {i} when i is a free player. So, every free player i gives a single
element equivalence class TΩ(i) = {i} in the partition TΩ of WΩ. When there is a free
player i and TΩ consists of only one set, then WΩ = {i}. In the sequel we call the number
of sets in TΩ the weakly free player cardinality of Ω. Since by Corollary 5.4 the set of weakly
free players is not-empty, this cardinality is at least one. It follows from Proposition 5.7
that rv,Ω is a veto-rich game when this cardinality is equal to one. Then the next corollary
follows from Arin and Feltkamp (1997).
Corollary 5.8 Let (v,Ω) be a game on a union closed system. Then the kernel K(rv,Ω)
contains the nucleolus Nuc(rv,Ω) as its unique element when the weakly free player cardi-
nality is one.
To generalize this, we use the famous theorem of Kohlberg (1971) giving a sufficient
and necessary condition for a payoff vector to be in the prenucleolus of a game. For game
v ∈ GN , a payoff vector x ∈ IRn and real number α, let B(α, x) be the collection of coalitions
given by B(α, x) = {S ∈ N | e(S, x) ≥ α}.
Theorem 5.9 (Kohlberg, 1971) For game v ∈ GN , a payoff vector x is in PN(v) if
and only if for any real number α the collection of coalitions B(α, x) is either balanced or
empty.
In Katsev and Yanovskaya (2010) an analogue of this theorem for the prekernel is
proved in terms of 2-balancedness. We first give the notion of k-balancedness for 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
Definition 5.10 A collection S of coalitions S ∈ 2N is k-balanced if for every coalition
K ⊆ N with |K| = k the collection SK = {S ′ ⊂ K |S ′ = S ∩K,S ∈ S} is balanced on K.
Theorem 5.11 (Katsev and Yanovskaya, 2010) For v ∈ GN , a payoff vector x is in
PK(v) if and only if for any real number α the collection of coalitions B(α, x) is either
2-balanced or empty.
Recall from the standard definition of balancedness that when a collection SK is
balanced on K, then there exist strictly positive weights λT , T ∈ SK, such that for every
i ∈ K the total weight of the sets T ∈ SK that contain i is equal to one. From this the
following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 5.12 Let K = {i, j} ⊆ N be a two-player coalition and S be a collection of
coalitions S ∈ 2N such that SK is balanced on K. When S contains a set T such that i ∈ T
and j ∈ T , then S contains a coalition T ′ such that j ∈ T ′ and i ∈ T ′.
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Also notice that a k-balanced collection S is balanced when k = n. Moreover it
should be noticed that when |N | = 3, any 2-balanced collection is also balanced. The next
lemma generalizes this fact and will be used to prove the main result of this section.
Lemma 5.13 For a union closed system Ω with weakly free player cardinality of at most
three, let B ⊂ 2N be a 2-balanced collection that only contains feasible sets in Ω and
singletons. Then B is balanced.
Proof. Let c ∈ {1, 2, 3} be the weakly free player cardinality of Ω. Without loss of
generality, let the players be numbered in such way that WΩ ⊃ {1, . . . , c} and that TΩ(k),
k = 1, . . . , c, are the equivalence classes of TΩ. By property 2 of Proposition 5.3, every
player j = k in TΩ(k) has player k as its superior. Also, by property 1 of Proposition 5.3
and by Proposition 5.6, every player j ∈ N \WΩ has at least one of the players k, k ∈ WΩ
as one of its superiors. For k ∈WΩ, suppose that there exists j in the set
SΩk \ {k} = {i ∈ N |k is a superior of i}
such that there is some T in B containing k, but not j. Take K = {k, j}. By the 2-
balancedness of B the collection {S ∩K | S ∈ B} is balanced on K. So, by Corollary 5.12
there exists a set T ′ ∈ B such that j ∈ T ′ and k ∈ T ′. Since B only contains feasible sets
and singletons, and k is a superior of j, it follows that T ′ = {j}. Let
Sk = ∩{S∈B|k∈S} S, k ∈WΩ.
From above it follows that {j} ∈ B for every j ∈ ∪k∈WΩ Sk. Now, let
B′ = {U ∈ B | U ∩WΩ = ∅}
and consider the collection of subsets of WΩ given by
B′′ = {WΩ ∩ U | U ∈ B
′}.
This is a balanced collection on WΩ. This is trivial when c = 1 and follows by the 2-
balancedness of B when c = 2. When c = 3 this follows from the fact that every 2-balanced
collection on a three player set is balanced. So, for the sets U ∈ B′ there are weights, say
λBU , such that∑
{U∈B′|k∈U}
λBU = 1, k ∈WΩ.
Since every feasible set has a nonempty intersection with WΩ, this yields weight λ
B
U > 0
for every feasible set U ∈ B. Moreover,
∑
{U∈B′|j∈U}
λBU = 1, for every j ∈ ∪k=1,...,c Sk,
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since if j ∈ Sk for some k = 1, . . . , c, then the collection of sets from B
′ containing j
coincides with the collection of sets from B’ containing k. Finally, consider some j ∈
N \ (∪k=1,...,c Sk). Recall that such a player j has at least one of the players from the set
WΩ as one of its superiors, say player k. So, when j is contained in some set U ∈ B′, then
also k ∈ U . Moreover, there exists at least one U ∈ B′ containing k and not j, otherwise
j ∈ Sk. Therefore,
∑
{U∈B′|j∈U}
λBU < 1 for every j ∈ N \ (∪k=1,...,c Sk),
i.e., the total weight of the feasible sets containing such a player j is less than one. However,
for every such j we also have that the singleton {j} ∈ B. This yields weight λB{j} =
1 −
∑
{U∈B′|j∈U}
λBU for every singleton set {j} ∈ B, j ∈ N \ (∪k=1,...,c Sk). Since for every
j ∈ ∪k=1,...,c Sk, every set in B containing j also contains one of the players from {1, . . . , c},
there are no other singletons in B. So, we have determined weights for all sets in B satisfying
that
∑
{S∈B|j∈S}
λBS = 1, for every j ∈ N,
and thus B is balanced. 
We are now ready to formulate the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.14 Let (v,Ω) be a monotone game on a union closed system. Then the in-
tersection of PK(v,Ω) and C(v,Ω) consists of at most one point if the weakly free player
cardinality of Ω is at most equal to three.
Proof. Clearly, the statement of the theorem is true when C(v,Ω) = ∅. So, we only
consider the case that C(v,Ω) = ∅. Then PN(v,Ω) = Nuc(v,Ω) and lies in the core.
Suppose there is a payoff vector y ∈ PK(v,Ω) ∩ C(v,Ω) with y = x = Nuc(v,Ω). Since
y = PN(v,Ω), according to Kohlberg’s theorem there is some α for which B(α, y) is
not balanced. Since x = PN(v,Ω), also according to Kohlberg’s theorem we have that
B(α, x) is balanced and thus B(α, x) = B(α, y). Since for α big enough we have that
B(α, x) = B(α, y) = ∅, there exists some value α with the properties that
(i) B(α, x) = B(α, y) and
(ii) for every β > α it is true that either B(β, x) = B(β, y) or both B(α, x) = B(β, x)
and B(α, y) = B(β, y).
For a coalition S and payoff vector x, let e(S, x) = rv,Ω(S) − x(S) = v(σΩ(S)) − x(S) be
the excess of coalition S at x in the restricted game rv,Ω and let α
∗ be a value satisfying
the two properties (i) and (ii). Now, suppose that there exists S ∈ B(α∗, x) such that
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e(S, x) < e(S, y). Then, for β = e(S, y) > e(S, x) ≥ α∗, we have that S ∈ B(β, y) and
S ∈ B(β, x). So, B(β, x) = B(β, y) and B(α∗, x) = B(β, x), which contradicts that property
(ii) holds for α∗. Hence
e(S, x) ≥ e(S, y) for every S ∈ B(α∗, x). (5.3)
Further, for S ∈ B(α∗, x), let λS be the weight of S in the balanced system of collection
B(α∗, x). Since both x and y are efficient, it follows that
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSe(S, x) =
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λS(rv,Ω(S)− x(S)).
Since x is efficient and by balancedness we have that
∑
{S∈B(α∗,x)|i∈S} λS = 1 for every
i ∈ N , it follows that
∑
S∈B(α∗,x)
λSx(S) =
∑
S∈B(α∗,x)
λS
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈N
xi
∑
{S∈B(α∗,x)|i∈S}
λS =
∑
i∈N
xi = rv,Ω(N),
and thus
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSe(S, x) =
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λS(rv,Ω(S)− x(S)).
=
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSrv,Ω(S)− rv,Ω(N).
Analogously
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSe(S, y) =
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSrv,Ω(S)− rv,Ω(N).
So,
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSe(S, x) =
∑
{S|S∈B(α∗,x)}
λSe(S, y).
With inequalities (5.3) this implies e(S, y) = e(S, x) for every S ∈ B(α∗, x) and thus
B(α∗, x) ⊆ B(α∗, y).
Now, suppose that also the collection B(α∗, y) is balanced. Then by the same
reasoning as above we obtain that e(S, x) = e(S, y) for every S ∈ B(α∗, y) and thus also
B(α∗, y) ⊆ B(α∗, x), which contradicts that B(α∗, x) = B(α∗, y). Hence B(α∗, y) is not
balanced.
On the other hand, by Theorem 5.11 we have that B(α∗, y) is 2-balanced, since
y ∈ PK(v,Ω). So, B(α∗, y) is 2-balanced, but not balanced. Then, according to Lemma
5.13, B(α∗, y) contains a non-feasible coalition S with |S| > 1. By definition of σΩ(S) and
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Ω being union closed, we have that rv,Ω(T ) = 0 for every T ⊆ S \ σΩ(S). Then for every
i ∈ S \ σΩ(S) it follows that
e(S, y) = rv,Ω(S)− y(S) = rv,Ω(σΩ(S))−
∑
j∈σΩ(S)
yj −
∑
h∈S\σΩ(S)
yh ≤
e(σΩ(S), y)− yi = e(σΩ(S), y) + e({i}, y),
because y ∈ C(rv,Ω) and thus yh ≥ rv,Ω({h}) = 0 for all h ∈ S \ σΩ(S). Since both
e(σΩ(S), y) ≤ 0 and e({i}, y) ≤ 0 (again because y ∈ C(rv,Ω)), it follows that
e(S, y) ≤ e(σΩ(S), y) and e(S, y) ≤ e({i}), y).
Hence both σ(S) ∈ B(α∗, y) and {i} ∈ B(α∗, y) for every i ∈ S \ σΩ(S). However,
then also the collection B(α∗, y) \ {S} is 2-balanced and not balanced. Let NF = {T ∈
B(α∗, y) | T is non-feasible and |T | > 1}. Repeating the reasoning above for every T ∈ NF
it follows that B′ = B(α∗, y) \ NF is 2-balanced and not balanced. However, since B′
only consists of feasible sets and singletons, this contradicts Lemma 5.13. So, there is no
y ∈ PK(v,Ω) ∩ C(v,Ω) with y = x = Nuc(v,Ω). 
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